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The article explores the (non)application of the “responsibility to protect” 
(RtoP) doctrine in crises in Libya and Syria. When violent conflicts between the 
government and the opposition arose in both countries in 2011, different interna-
tional bodies reported on mass atrocity crimes committed by the government forces 
against civilians. As rulers of Libya and Syria showed no intention of halting 
those atrocities, it was expected that the international community would intervene 
and act under RtoP, as agreed among the states at the 2005 World Summit. In 
Libya, the Security Council acted pursuant to the RtoP doctrine and passed the 
resolution authorizing the use of force aimed at saving civilian lives. In the case of 
Syria, however, the Security Council was deadlocked by the Russian and Chinese 
veto and no resolution employing RtoP could have been adopted. The paper thus 
analyzes these two cases, by paying special emphasis to the reasons behind such a 
disparate reaction of the Security Council in similar circumstances.
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1. INTRODUCTION
When	 protesters	 in	 Libya	 rose	 against	 Muammar	 Gaddafi	 in	 February	
2011,	mass	atrocities	committed	by	the	government	forces	against	the	prote-
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sters	called	for	an	immediate	invocation	of	the	RtoP	principle.	Surprisingly,	
the	United	Nations	Security	Council	(SC)	managed	to	consolidate	and	passed	
the	Resolution	1973,	thus	authorizing	the	use	of	force	and	establishing	“a	ban	
on	all	flights	in	the	airspace	of	the	Libyan	Arab	Jamahiriya	in	order	to	help	
protect	civilians”.1
It	seemed	that	the	crisis	in	Libya	at	the	time	constituted	a	firm	basis	for	the	
application	of	the	RtoP	principle.	When	large	scale	atrocities	started	to	take	
place,	Gaddafi	was	not	only	reluctant	to	stop	them,	but	also	further	incited	
them	by	referring	to	the	protesters	as	“cockroaches”	and	“rats”,	thus	using	the	
same	abusive	language	as	the	Hutu	population	in	the	Rwandan	massacre.2	Let	
us	be	reminded	that	it	was	the	Rwandan	massacre,	together	with	the	one	in	
Srebrenica,	which	inspired	the	creation	of	the	RtoP	principle	in	the	first	place.
As	much	as	the	situation	in	Libya	created	a	flourishing	ground	for	the	appli-
cation	of	RtoP,	the	Resolution	1973	and	the	subsequent	NATO	intervention	
in	Libya	were	seen	by	many	as	unexpected.	This	“political	surprise”,	as	some	
tend	to	refer	to	the	intervention3,	showed	that	it	did	not	take	long	before	RtoP	
had	been	transferred	from	theory	to	practice.	Encouraged	by	such	events,	the	
UN	Secretary-General	Ban	Ki-moon	stated	the	following:
“Today	we	mark	the	first	decade	in	the	life	of	the	responsibility	to	protect.	
There	will	be	many	more,	for	we	can	now	say	with	confidence	that	this	funda-
mental	principle	of	human	protection	is	here	to	stay.”4
Predictions	of	the	Secretary-General,	however,	turned	out	to	be	premature.	
RtoP	faced	its	next	test	soon	after	Libya,	when	the	conflict	in	Syria	broke	out.	
It	did	not	take	long	before	various	international	bodies	started	to	report	on	
gross	violations	of	human	rights	committed	by	the	Syrian	armed	forces	against	
the	protesters.5	Unlike	Libya,	in	Syria	occurred	a	well-known	scenario	of	the	
1	 SC	Res.	1973	(2011),	paragraph	6.
2 Libya Protests: Defiant Gaddafi refuses to quit,	BBC	News,	22	February	2011,	http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12544624	(10	March	2017).
3	 Garwood-Gowers,	A.,	The Responsibility to Protect and the Arab Spring: Libya as the 
Exception, Syria as the Norm?,	UNSW	Law	Journal,	vol.	36,	2013,	p.	603.
4 “Responsibility to Protect” came of Age in 2011,	Secretary-General	Tells	Conference,	
Stressing	Need	 to	Prevent	Conflict	Before	 It	Breaks	Out,	 SG/SM/14068,	http://
www.un.org/press/en/2012/sgsm14068.doc.htm	(10	March	2017).
5	 See:	Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of 
human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic,	 A/HRC/18/53,	 http://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/countries/SY/Syria_Report_2011-08-17.pdf	(10	March	2017);	Human 
Rights Council Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Re-
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SC	being	deadlocked	by	veto.	It	became	obvious	that	Libya	was	an	exception	
and	that	future	implementation	of	RtoP	might	face	the	same	obstacles	as	did	
the	doctrine	of	humanitarian	intervention.
This	article	examines	the	implications	of	the	conflicts	in	Libya	and	Syria	for	
the	RtoP	doctrine.	It	first	gives	a	summarized	overview	of	the	RtoP	principle.	
Then	it	sets	out	to	analyze	the	crises	in	Libya	and	Syria,	both	from	a	factual	
and	a	legal	point	of	view.	In	addition,	a	comparison	between	the	two	cases	is	
given,	with	special	emphasis	on	the	reasons	behind	the	disparate	reactions	of	
the	SC	to	the	factually	similar	situations.	Finally,	concluding	remarks	on	the	
status	of	RtoP	after	Libya	and	Syria	are	given.
2. EVOLUTION AND CONTENTS OF RTOP
History	shows	that	great	humanitarian	catastrophes	are	usually	followed	by	
an	impetus	of	the	international	community	to	create	mechanisms	for	future	
prevention	of	such	catastrophes.	The	UN	Secretary-General	Kofi	Annan	provi-
ded	such	impetus	after	witnessing	a	failure	of	the	international	community	to	
stop	several	humanitarian	catastrophes,	such	as	those	in	Rwanda	and	Bosnia.	
In	his	Millennium	Report	to	the	General	Assembly	in	2000,	Annan	posed	an	
important	question:
“If	humanitarian	intervention	is,	indeed,	an	unacceptable	assault	on	sove-
reignty,	how	should	we	respond	to	a	Rwanda,	to	a	Srebrenica	–	to	gross	and	
systematic	violations	of	human	rights	that	affect	every	precept	of	our	common	
humanity?”6
The	Secretary-General	has	 thus	pointed	 to	 the	problem	of	contradictory	
obligations	of	states:	on	the	one	hand,	the	obligations	of	non-intervention	and	
respect	for	state	sovereignty,	and	on	the	other,	the	obligation	of	human	rights	
protection.
The	appeal	of	the	Secretary-General	has	resulted	in	the	establishment	of	
the	International	Commission	on	Intervention	and	State	Sovereignty.	In	its	
2001	Report,	the	Commission	coined	a	new	term,	hence,	the	“responsibility	to	
public,	 S-17/1,	 http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/
ResS17_1.pdf	(10	March	2017).
6 We the peoples: the role of the United Nations in the twenty-first century,	Report	of	the	
Secretary-General,	 A/54/2000,	 http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/pdfs/We_
The_Peoples.pdf	(10	March	2017).
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protect”	(RtoP,	R2P).7	Although	the	Report	begins	by	noting	that	it	is	“about	
the	so-called	right	of	humanitarian	intervention”,	its	real	intention	is	to	shift	
the	focus	of	the	debate	from	“the	right	to	intervene”	to	“the	responsibility	to	
protect”.8	According	 to	 the	Report,	 the	 primary	 responsibility	 lies	with	 the	
state	itself	to	guarantee	the	protection	of	its	people.	Alternatively,	if	a	popu-
lation	of	a	particular	state	is	suffering	serious	harm	as	a	result	of	internal	war,	
insurgency,	repression	or	state	failure,	and	the	state	in	question	is	unwilling	
or	unable	 to	halt	or	avert	 it,	 the	principle	of	non-intervention	yields	 to	 the	
international	responsibility	to	protect.9	The	meaning	of	the	RtoP	concept	is	
based	on	three	distinct	responsibilities:	the	responsibility	to	prevent,	the	res-
ponsibility	to	react	and	the	responsibility	to	rebuild.	The	most	controversial	
responsibility,	the	one	to	react,	arises	when	preventive	measures	fail	to	resolve	
the	situation	or	when	a	state	is	unable	or	unwilling	to	redress	the	situation.10 
These	measures	may	include	political,	economic	or	judicial	measures	and,	in	
extreme	cases,	even	military	action.11
In	 light	 of	 proposing	 a	military	 action	 as	 one	 aspect	 of	RtoP,	 the	 2001	
Report	addressed	the	question	of	the	right	authority	to	take	such	action.	The	
Report	identified	the	UN	SC	as	a	body	primarily	entitled	to	authorize	the	use	
of	force.12	However,	it	provided	alternatives	to	the	SC	in	cases	when	it	fails	to	
act.	The	alternatives	include	General	Assembly,	acting	under	the	“Uniting	for	
Peace”	Resolution13,	and	regional	or	sub-regional	organizations.14	The	military	
aspect	of	RtoP	in	the	ICISS	Report	raised	a	concern	with	the	non-Western	
powers,	which	traditionally	fear	the	hegemonic	interference	of	Western	states	
in	the	internal	affairs	of	other	states.15	As	a	result,	all	subsequent	documents	
7 The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty,	http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf	(10	March	
2017).
8 Ibid.,	¶	2.29.
9 Ibid.,	p.	XI.
10 Ibid.,	¶	4.1.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.,	¶	6.14.
13 Ibid.,	¶	6.29.
14 Ibid.,	¶	6.31-6.35.
15	 China,	for	instance,	asserted	that	“certain	Western	powers	have	played	with	noble	
principles	 to	 serve	 their	own	hegemonic	 interests”.	 ICISS,	The	Responsibility	 to	
Protect:	Research,	Bibliography,	Background:	Supplementary	Volume	 to	 the	Re-
port	of	the	International	Commission	on	Intervention	and	State	Sovereignty,	ci-
ted	in:	Garwood-Gowers,	A.,	China’s “Responsible Protection” Concept: Re-interpreting 
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embracing	 RtoP	 are	more	 restrained	with	 respect	 to	 proposing	 the	 compe-
tent	authority	for	authorizing	the	use	of	force.	The	UN	High-Level	Panel	on	
Threats,	Challenges	and	Change,	as	well	as	the	Secretary-General	in	his	2005	
Report,	thus	provided	no	alternatives	to	the	SC	as	the	competent	authority	for	
authorizing	a	military	action.16
It	may	be	suggested	that	the	most	authoritative	document	promoting	RtoP	
is	the	2005	World	Summit	Outcome	Document,	which	reflects	the	opinion	
of	more	than	170	states	participating	in	the	Summit.	This	Document	is	far	
less	enthusiastic	with	regard	to	RtoP	than	the	ICISS	Report	and	reflects	diver-
gent	attitudes	of	states	towards	this	principle.	States	generally	accept	to	act	in	
accordance	with	RtoP	in	cases	of	genocide,	war	crimes,	ethnic	cleansing	and	
crimes	against	humanity.	As	in	the	ICISS	Report,	the	responsibility	to	protect	
lies	with	each	individual	state	in	relation	to	its	own	population.17	The	inter-
national	community,	on	the	other	hand,	should	encourage	states	in	fulfilling	
that	responsibility,	and	should	itself	use	appropriate	diplomatic,	humanitarian	
and	other	peaceful	means	in	order	to	protect	populations	from	genocide,	war	
crimes,	ethnic	cleansing	and	crimes	against	humanity.18	Furthermore,	 states	
are	prepared	to	take	collective	action	through	the	SC	and	in	accordance	with	
the	Charter,	including	Chapter	VII,	on	a	case-by-case	basis	and	in	cooperation	
with	 relevant	 regional	 organizations	 as	 appropriate,	 should	 peaceful	means	
be	inadequate	and	national	authorities	are	manifestly	failing	to	protect	their	
populations	from	the	above	crimes.19 
The	wording	of	the	World	Summit	Outcome	Document	reveals	that	states	
are	willing	to	embrace	the	RtoP	principle	merely	as	their	moral	obligation,	but	
not	as	a	legal	one.20	Undertaking	a	collective	action	remains	the	states’	legal	
obligation	solely	under	the	authorization	of	the	SC,	under	Chapter	VII	of	the	
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and military intervention for humanitarian purposes,	Asian	
Journal	of	International	Law,	vol.	6,	nr.	1,	2016,	p.	5.
16 A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility,	Report	of	 the	Secretary-General’s	
High-Level	Panel	on	Threats,	Challenges	and	Change,	A/59/565;	In Larger Freedom: 
towards Development, Security and Human Rights for all,	Report	of	the	Secretary-Gene-
ral,	A/59/2005.
17 Summit Outcome Document,	A/RES/60/1,	¶	138.
18 Ibid.,	¶	139.
19 Ibid.
20	 See:	Mohamed,	S.,	Taking Stock of the Responsibility to Protect,	Stanford	Journal	of	
International	Law,	vol.	48,	nr.	2,	2012,	p.	326;	Garwood-Gowers,	op. cit.	(fn.	3),	p.	
600.
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UN	Charter.	 In	other	words,	 the	 introduction	of	RtoP	did	not	 impose	any	
new	 legal	obligations	upon	 the	 states.	Some	commentators	believe,	 though,	
that	 the	 significance	of	RtoP	 lies	 in	 strengthening	 the	 legitimacy	of	 the	SC	
actions.21
After	the	adoption	of	the	2005	Outcome	Document,	RtoP	has	remained	
present	in	international	discourse.	Since	2009,	the	Secretary-General	has	been	
issuing	annual	reports	on	the	matter.22	These	reports	put	an	emphasis	on	the	
preventive	character	of	RtoP,	rather	than	on	the	contentious	issue	of	the	use	
of	force.	Also,	the	SC	regularly	invokes	RtoP	in	its	resolutions.	So	far,	51	such	
resolutions	have	been	adopted.23
After	briefly	discussing	 the	meaning	of	 the	RtoP	principle,	 the	 following	
chapters	analyze	the	cases	of	Libya	and	Syria.	The	analysis	aims	at	revealing	
how	RtoP	functions	 in	practice	and	what	are	the	consequences	of	 its	 (non)
implementation	for	the	future	of	the	principle.
3. THE CASE OF LIBYA
3.1. Outbreak of hostilities and the international response to the 
Libyan crisis prior to Resolution 1973
The	 Arab	 Spring,	 which	 firstly	 occurred	 in	 Egypt	 and	 Tunisia,	 spread	
to	 Libya	 in	 February	 2011.	 Although	 none	 of	 the	world’s	 existing	 atrocity	
risk	assessment	frameworks	identified	Libya	as	one	of	the	countries	being	at	
risk24,	the	initially	peaceful	protests	turned	violent	as	the	government	forces	
acted	brutally	 towards	protesters	 against	Gaddafi’s	 rule.	 In	 a	manner	 remi-
niscent	of	the	Rwandan	massacre,	Gaddafi	declared	that	“officers	have	been	
deployed	in	all	tribes	and	regions	so	that	they	can	purify	all	decisions	from	
21	 Payandeh,	M.,	With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility? The Concept of the Respon-
sibility to Protect within the Process of International Lawmaking,	Yale	Journal	of	Interna-
tional	Law,	vol.	35,	nr.	2,	2010,	p.	496.	
22	 For	all	the	reports	see:	http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?session=149Y9
RT893810.2319&limitbox_2=TM01+%3D+tm_b15&ultype=PD01&uloper=
%3E&ullimit=2005&menu=search&aspect=subtab124&npp=50&ipp=20&spp
=20&profile=bib&ri=1&source=~%21horizon&index=.TW&term=responsibili
ty+to+protect&x=0&y=0&aspect=subtab124	(20	June	2017).	
23	 See:	Global	Centre	for	the	Responsibility	to	Protect,	http://www.globalr2p.org/re-
sources/335	(21	March	2017).	
24	 Bellamy,	A.	J.;	Williams,	P.	D.,	The New Politics of Protection? Cote d’Ivoire, Libya and 
the Responsibility to Protect,	International	Affairs,	vol.	87,	nr.	4,	2011,	p.	838.
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these	cockroaches”	and	that	“any	Libyan	who	takes	arms	against	Libya	will	be	
executed”.25
Various	UN	bodies	promptly	reacted	to	the	reports	on	massive	violations	of	
human	rights	committed	by	government	forces.	The	Secretary-General	called	
for	an	immediate	end	to	violence,	expressing	his	outrage	at	press	reports	accor-
ding	to	which	the	Libyan	authorities	have	been	firing	at	demonstrators	from	
warplanes	and	helicopters.26	He	characterized	those	attacks	as	serious	violati-
ons	of	international	humanitarian	law.27	The	UN	OHCHR	called	for	immedia-
te	cessation	of	illegal	acts	of	violence	against	demonstrators	and	for	full	and	in-
dependent	investigation,	emphasizing	that	widespread	and	systematic	attacks	
against	the	civilian	population	may	amount	to	crimes	against	humanity.28	The	
same	characterization	of	the	attacks	was	given	by	the	Secretary-General’s	Spe-
cial	Adviser	on	the	Prevention	of	Genocide	and	the	Responsibility	to	Protect.29
The	SC	issued	a	press	release	expressing	grave	concern	over	the	situation	
in	Libya.	Members	of	the	Council	condemned	the	use	of	force	against	civili-
ans	and	called	for	an	immediate	end	to	violence.	They	also	called	on	the	Go-
vernment	of	Libya	to	meet	its	responsibility	to	protect	its	population.30
Events	 in	 Libya	were	 also	 condemned	 by	 several	 regional	 organizations.	
The	Arab	League	condemned	“the	Libya	government’s	violent	crackdown	of	
the	protesters	and	suspended	it	from	participation	in	League	meetings”.31	In	
a	 similar	 vein,	 the	Peace	 and	 the	SC	of	 the	African	Union	 condemned	 the	
“indiscriminate	and	excessive	use	of	force	and	lethal	weapons	against	peaceful	
protesters”,	and	“stressed	the	need	for	the	people	of	Libya	to	spare	no	effort	
25 Ibid.
26 Outraged Secretary-General Calls for Immediate End to Violence in Libya,	Press	Release,	
SG/SM/13408-AFR/2119,	22	February	2011.
27 Ibid.
28 Pillay Calls for International Inquiry into Libyan Violence and Justice for Victims,	Office	
of	the	High	Commissioner	for	Human	Rights,	Press	Release,	22	February	2011.
29 UN Secretary-General Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility 
to Protect, Edward Luck, on the situation in Libya,	Press	Release,	22	February	2011.
30 SC Press Statement on Libya,	 Press	 Release,	 SC/10180-AFR/2120,	 22	 February	
2011.
31	 Galal,	O.,	Arab League Bars Libya from Meetings, citing Forces’ Crimes,	Bloomberg	News	
Service,	22	February	2011,	cited	in:	Davis,	J.	(ed.),	The Arab Spring and Arab Thaw, 
Unfinished Revolutions and the Quest for Democracy,	 Routledge,	 London/New	York,	
2016,	p.	183.
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in	avoiding	any	further	loss	of	life”.32	Finally,	both	the	Organization	of	Islamic	
Cooperation	and	the	European	Union	condemned	human	rights	violations.33
Following	continuing	reports	on	the	 indiscriminate	use	of	 force	resulting	
in	“high	casualties”,	 the	Secretary-General	urged	the	members	of	 the	SC	to	
“consider	concrete	action	to	stop	the	violence	and	end	the	loss	of	life”.34	The	
Human	Rights	Council	adopted	a	resolution	to	monitor	the	human	rights	si-
tuation	in	Libya,	condemning	gross	and	systematic	human	rights	violations.	
The	Resolution	called	upon	the	Libyan	Government	to	meet	its	responsibility	
to	protect	its	population	and	to	immediately	put	an	end	to	all	human	rights	
violations.35	The	SC	unanimously	passed	the	Resolution	1970,	under	Chap-
ter	VII	of	the	UN	Charter.	In	the	Resolution,	the	SC	deplored	the	gross	and	
systematic	violation	of	human	rights,	expressing	deep	concern	at	the	deaths	of	
civilians	and	rejecting	unequivocally	the	incitement	to	hostility	and	violence	
against	the	civilian	population	committed	by	the	highest	officials	of	the	Libyan	
government.36	It	recalled	the	Libyan	authorities’	responsibility	to	protect	its	
population	 and	demanded	an	 immediate	 end	 to	 violence.37	The	SC	 further	
decided	to	refer	the	situation	in	Libya	to	the	Prosecutor	of	the	International	
Criminal	Court,	as	well	as	to	impose	an	arms	embargo	on	Libya.38	Sanctions	in	
form	of	assets	freeze	and	travel	bans	have	been	imposed	on	targeted	individu-
als	within	Gaddafi’s	administration.39
Violence	in	Libya	did	not	cease	in	the	aftermath	of	the	Resolution.	In	his	
address	 to	 the	General	 Assembly	 on	 1	March	 2011,	 the	 Secretary-General	
called	for	a	“concrete	action”	and	for	a	“rapid	and	concrete	response”	to	the	
Libyan	crisis.40	The	Gulf	Cooperation	Council	urged	the	SC	to	take	“all	ne-
32 African Union Peace and Security Council, Communique,	 261st	 Meeting,	 PSC/PR/
COMM(CCLXI),	23	February	2011.
33 Declaration by the High Representative, Catherine Ashton, on behalf of the European Union 
on Events in Libya,	6795/1/11,	Presse	3,	20	February	2011.
34 Fundamental Issues of Peace, Security at Stake, Secretary-General Warns as He Briefs SC 
on the Situation in Libya,	SC/10185,	25	February	2011.
35 Situation of human rights in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,	Resolution	adopted	by	the	
Human	Rights	Council,	S-15/1,	A/HRC/RES/S-15/1,	25	February	2011.
36	 S/RES/1970	(2011).
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.	
39 Ibid.
40 United Nations Response to Violence against Civilians in Libya Sends Strong Message There 
Is ‘No Impunity’ for Crimes against Humanity,	Secretary-General	Press	Release,	SG/
SM/13425-GA/11051-AFR/2130,	1	March	2017.
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cessary	measures	to	protect	civilians,	 including	enforcing	a	no-fly	zone	over	
Libya”.41	The	African	Union	called	on	“the	responsibility	of	the	African	Uni-
on…and	the	international	community	to	take	all	the	necessary	political	and	le-
gal	measures	for	the	protection	of	the	Libyan	population”.42	The	Arab	League,	
the	Organization	of	Islamic	Cooperation	and	the	European	Union	also	called	
for	an	 imposition	of	a	no-fly	zone.43	The	Arab	League	further	declared	that	
Libyan	authorities	lost	their	legitimacy	and	that	it	was	recognizing	the	rebel	
movement	as	that	country’s	legitimate	government.44	The	Libyan	Ambassador	
to	the	UN	called	upon	the	UN	member	states	to	recognize	the	Libyan	Natio-
nal	Transitional	Council	as	a	legitimate	authority.45
3.2. Resolution 1973 and military intervention in Libya
Following	these	events	and	responding	to	the	renewed	threats	against	civi-
lians	that	Gaddafi	had	made	on	17	March	2011,	the	SC	passed	the	Resolution	
1973,	with	ten	affirmative	votes	and	five	abstentions.46	The	SC	reiterated	the	
responsibility	of	the	Libyan	authorities	to	protect	the	Libyan	population	and	
condemned	the	gross	and	systematic	violation	of	human	rights.	It	considered	
that	widespread	and	systematic	attacks	in	Libya	might	amount	to	crimes	aga-
41	 See:	GCC backs no-fly zone to protect civilians in Libya,	http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/
government/gcc-backs-no-fly-zone-to-protect-civilians-in-libya-1.773448	 (27	 Fe-
bruary	2017).
42	 See:	African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Resolution on the Human Rights 
Situation in the Great Socialist Peoples’ Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,	1	March	2011,	ACHPR/
RES.181(EXT.OS/IX)2011,	 http://www.refworld.org/docid/4d8863f82.html	 (28	
March	2017);	Ihsanoglu Support No-Fly Decision At OIC Meeting On Libya, Calls For An 
Islamic Humanitarian Programme In And Outside Libya,	8	March	2011,	www.lcil.cam.
ac.uk/sites/default/files/LCIL/documents/arabspring/libya/Libya_15_Ihsanoglu_
Support.pdf	(28	March	2017);	European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2011 on the 
Southern Neighborhood, and Libya in particular,	http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/
getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2011-0095+0+DOC+XML+V0//
EN	(28	March	2017).
43	 Leiby,	R.;	Mansour,	M.,	Arab League asks U.N. for no-fly zone over Libya,	The	Washi-
ngton	 Post,	 12	 March	 2011,	 https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/arab-lea-
gue-asks-un-for-no-fly-zone-over-libya/2011/03/12/ABoie0R_story.html?utm_
term=.90738e7d8def	(28	March	2017).
44 Ibid.
45	 Talmon,	S.,	Recognition of the Libyan National Transitional Council,	ASIL,	vol.	15,	nr.	
16,	2011,	https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/15/issue/16/recognition-libyan-nati-
onal-transitional-council	(29	March	2017).
46	 Russia,	China,	Brazil,	India	and	Germany	abstained	from	voting.
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inst	humanity.	The	Council	determined	that	the	situation	in	Libya	constituted	
a	threat	to	international	peace	and	security	and	acted	pursuant	to	Chapter	VII	
of	the	UN	Charter.	With	regard	to	the	protection	of	civilians,	it	authorized	
member	states	to	take	“all	necessary	measures…to	protect	civilians	and	civilian	
populated	areas	under	threat	of	attack…,	while	excluding	a	foreign	occupation	
force	of	any	form	on	any	part	of	Libyan	territory”.47	It	strengthened	sanctions	
against	 designated	 individuals,	 imposed	by	 the	Resolution	1970.	 Finally,	 it	
established	a	no-fly	zone,	that	is,	a	ban	on	all	flights,	with	the	exception	of	the	
ones	for	humanitarian	purposes.	In	order	to	operationalize	such	a	ban,	it	aut-
horized	member	states	to	“take	all	necessary	measures	to	enforce	compliance	
with	the	ban	on	flights”.48
Following	the	adoption	of	the	Resolution	1973,	a	military	coalition	led	by	
NATO	undertook	an	intervention	in	Libya.	The	US	conducted	an	air	campai-
gn	against	Gaddafi’s	forces,	while	NATO	assumed	responsibility	for	enforcing	
the	arms	embargo	and	a	no-fly	zone.49	During	the	intervention,	diverging	atti-
tudes	of	the	permanent	members	of	the	SC	toward	military	actions	could	have	
been	observed.	When	a	NATO	airstrike	resulted	in	Gaddafi’s	son	and	three	
grandchildren	being	killed	in	their	own	home,	Russia	condemned	the	attack,	
calling	it	“a	disproportionate	use	of	force”.50	The	intervention	lasted	for	seven	
months,	until	Gaddafi	was	ousted	from	power	and	ultimately	murdered.	At	
that	time,	the	UN	ended	a	mandate	for	NATO	operations	in	Libya.51 
The	Resolution	was	 rightly	 considered	 to	 be	 “groundbreaking”52,	 not	 so	
much	for	the	fact	that	the	SC	members	managed	to	reach	an	agreement	on	the	
authorization	to	use	“all	necessary	means”	to	protect	civilians,	for	such	autho-
rizations	already	existed	in	some	previous	resolutions53,	but	for	the	fact	that	it	
47	 S/RES/1973	(2011).
48 Ibid.
49	 Nanda,	V.	P.,	The Future Under International Law of Responsibility to Protect after Libya 
and Syria,	Michigan	State	International	Law	Review,	vol.	21,	2013,	p.	13.
50	 Denyer,	S.;	Fadel,	L.,	Gaddafi’s youngest son killed in NATO airstrike; Russia condemns 
attack,	The	Washington	Post,	1	May	2011,	https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
gaddafi-calls-for-cease-fire-as-nato-strikes-tripoli/2011/04/30/AF1jZsNF_story.
html?utm_term=.d3b117714565	(30	March	2017).
51	 Charbonneau,	L.,	U.N. ends mandate for NATO operations in Libya,	Reuters,	27	Octo-
ber	 2011,	 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-un-idUSTRE79P6EC20111027	
(30	March	2017).
52	 Zifcak,	S.,	The Responsibility to Protect after Libya and Syria,	Melbourne	Journal	of	
International	Law,	vol.	13,	2012,	p.	64.
53	 See	resolutions	on	Somalia	and	Haiti:	S/RES/794	(1992);	S/RES/940	(1994).
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is	the	first	time	that	the	Council	authorized	the	use	of	force	in	order	to	protect	
civilians	without	the	consent	of	the	host	state.
3.3. Responsibility to Protect in the Libyan crisis 
The	Libyan	crisis	was	the	first	test	of	how	the	RtoP	principle,	endorsed	at	
the	2005	Summit	as	a	theoretical	concept,	functions	in	practice.	When	a	hu-
manitarian	disaster	seemed	likely	to	happen,	many	believed	that	Libya	was	a	
point	where	RtoP	will	“either	triumph	or	die”.54
Following	the	adoption	of	the	Resolution	1973,	the	coalition	of	Western	
states,	 and	 subsequently	 NATO	 forces,	 undertook	 military	 intervention	 in	
Libya.	The	aim	of	the	Resolution	was	not	to	intervene	in	the	internal	conflict,	
but	 to	protect	 the	 civilian	population.	To	be	 sure,	 this	 aim	was	 accomplis-
hed,	for	the	intervention	saved	many	civilian	lives,	which	were	jeopardized	by	
outright	threats	Gaddafi	had	made.	Some	believe	this	is	enough	to	claim	the	
“triumph”	of	RtoP.55
From	the	legal	point	of	view,	the	intervention	was	undoubtedly	justified.	
The	SC	is	empowered	by	the	UN	Charter	to	authorize	the	use	of	force	in	case	
of	a	threat	to	international	peace	and	security,	and	it	thus	acted	accordingly.	
The	motive	of	the	intervention,	however,	is	the	element	that	needs	to	be	con-
sidered	in	order	to	reveal	whether	an	action	fits	into	the	RtoP	framework.	It,	
therefore,	needs	to	be	determined	whether	the	aim	of	the	intervention	was	to	
save	the	civilian	population	from	atrocities,	thus	promoting	and	strengthening	
the	principle,	or	whether	the	Libyan	scenario,	as	some	would	say,	gave	RtoP	a	
“bad	name”.56
As	noted	above,	the	SC	passed	the	Resolution	1973	with	ten	affirmative	
votes	and	5	states,	including	Russia	and	China,	abstaining.	These	two	states,	
which	traditionally	veto	similar	resolutions,	clearly	did	not	want	to	take	res-
ponsibility	for	a	humanitarian	catastrophe	which	would	have	happened	had	
54 The Lessons of Libya,	 The	 Economist,	 19	May	 2011,	 http://www.economist.com/
node/18709571	(31	March	2017).
55	 See:	Thakur,	R.,	R2P, Libya and International Politics as the Struggle for Competing Nor-
mative Architecture,	 E-international	 relations,	 http://www.e-ir.info/2011/09/07/
r2p-libya-and-international-politics-as-the-struggle-for-competing-normative-archi-
tectures/	(31	March	2017).
56	 Words	of	Indian	UN	representative,	cited	in:	Mohamed,	S.,	Syria, the United Nati-
ons and the Responsibility to Protect,	American	Society	of	International	Law	Proceedin-
gs,	nr.	106,	2012,	p.	223.
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the	Resolution	not	been	adopted.	But	in	spite	of	the	fact	that	the	Resolution	
was	passed,	a	disagreement	among	the	SC	members	over	the	implications	of	
the	Resolution	was	present	immediately	after	its	adoption.	States	which	ab-
stained	from	voting	expressed	their	concern	over	the	implementation	of	the	
resolution.	Germany	saw	“great	risks”	 in	using	military	 force	and	a	“danger	
of	being	drawn	into	a	protracted	military	conflict	that	would	affect	the	wider	
region”.57	The	Indian	representative	was	concerned	with	the	“[lack of]	clarity	
about	details	of	enforcement	measures,	including	who	will	participate	and	with	
what	assets,	and	how	these	measures	will	exactly	be	carried	out”.58	The	repre-
sentative	of	Brazil	expressed	doubt	as	to	whether	“the	use	of	force	as	provided	
for	in	paragraph	4	of	the	Resolution	will	lead	to	the	realization	of…common	
objective	—	the	immediate	end	to	violence	and	the	protection	of	civilians”.59 
He	 further	 raised	 concerns	 that	 “such	measures	 may	 have	 the	 unintended	
effect	of	 exacerbating	 tensions	on	 the	 ground	and	 causing	more	harm	 than	
good	to	the	very	same	civilians…[they]	are	committed	to	protecting”.60	The	
Russian	representative	pointed	out	that	the	whole	range	of	concrete	and	legi-
timate	questions	raised	by	Russia	and	other	members	of	the	Council	remained	
unanswered.	Those	questions,	he	said,	“touched	on	how	the	no-fly	zone	would	
be	enforced,	what	the	rules	of	engagement	would	be	and	what	limits	on	the	use	
of	 force	there	would	be”.61	Similarly,	 the	Chinese	representative	stated	that	
some	“specific	questions…failed	to	be	clarified	or	answered”	and	that	“China	
has	serious	difficulty	with	parts	of	the	resolution”.62	These	statements	show	
that	there	was	no	real	agreement	on	the	use	of	military	force	among	states,	not	
even	upon	the	adoption	of	the	resolution,	let	alone	during	the	intervention,	
which	went	beyond	the	sole	protection	of	civilians.
The	intervention	in	Libya	was	according	to	the	text	of	the	Resolution	1973	
and	the	statements	of	several	world	leaders	and	NATO	officials	supposed	to	
be	limited	to	the	protection	of	civilians.	NATO	Defense	Ministers	issued	a	sta-
tement	on	Libya,	in	which	they	reiterated	the	mandate	of	both	the	Resolution	
1970	and	1973	to	protect	civilians.63	The	US,	the	UK	and	French	leaders	also	
57	 SC,	6498th	meeting,	17	March	2011,	S/PV.6498,	p.	5.
58 Ibid.,	p.	6.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.,	p.	8
62 Ibid,	p.	10.
63 Statement on Libya, Following the Working Lunch of NATO Ministers of Defense with non-
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emphasized	the	 limited	objectives	of	 the	Resolution	1973.64	However,	 their	
statement	suggesting	that	“it	is	impossible	to	imagine	a	future	for	Libya	with	
Gaddafi	in	power”	might	lead	to	a	different	conclusion.65	Following	the	inter-
vention,	many	believed	that	it	 is	the	regime	change	that	the	foreign	powers	
were	ultimately	after.	A	concern	about	protecting	human	lives	was	perceived	
by	some	critics	as	a	pretext	for	an	unlawful	intervention,	which	goes	far	beyond	
the	mandate	given	by	the	Resolution	1973.	They	claim	that	the	US,	the	UK	
and	France	have	each	allied	with	governments	such	as	Guatemala,	Indonesia,	
Colombia	and	Zaire,	which	have	in	recent	decades	engaged	in	the	slaughter	
of	civilians	as	bad	or	worse	as	had	been	occurring	in	Libya.66	Additionally,	the	
critics	question	the	argument	of	the	regional	consensus	giving	weight	to	the	le-
gitimacy	of	the	intervention.	In	their	view,	the	Arab	League,	which	supported	
the	establishment	of	a	no-fly	zone,	is	an	organization	composed	primarily	of	
pro-Western	autocracies	which	have	shown	little	hesitance	in	brutally	suppre-
ssing	their	own	pro-democratic	struggles.67
It	was	rather	difficult	to	separate	the	motive	of	saving	the	civilian	popula-
tion	from	the	motive	of	changing	the	regime	in	the	case	of	Libya.	Considering	
Gaddafi’s	 threats	 against	 the	 protesters	 and	 his	 determination	 to	 eliminate	
them,	it	is	doubtful	whether	the	aim	of	protecting	the	population	could	have	
been	accomplished	with	Gaddafi	in	power.	But	regardless	of	whether	the	regi-
me	change	was	a	pretext	for	the	intervention	in	Libya	or	a	spontaneous	course	
of	events	in	saving	the	Libyan	population	from	mass	atrocity	crimes,	the	fact	
remains	that	the	intervention	aimed	at	regime	change	and	as	such	exceeded	
the	mandate	of	protecting	civilian	lives.	If	NATO	had	abided	by	the	narrow	
mandate	from	the	Resolution	1973,	it	would	have	probably	assuaged	the	fears	
NATO Contributors to Operation Unified Protector,	NATO	Press	Release	071,	8	June	
2011,	http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_75177.htm	(31	March	2017).
64 Libya’s Pathway to Peace,	The	New	York	Times,	14	April	2011,	http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/04/15/opinion/15iht-edlibya15.html	 (31	March	 2017).	 See	 also	 Presi-
dent	Obama’s	Address	to	the	Nation,	in	which	he	said	that	“broadening	… [US] 
military	mission	to	include	regime	change	would	be	a	mistake”.	Remarks by the Pre-
sident in Address to the Nation on Libya,	28	March	2011,	https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/28/remarks-president-address-nation-libya	
(9	June	2017).
65 Supra	note	64,	Libya’s	Pathway	to	Peace.
66	 Zunes,	S.,	Libya, the “Responsibility to Protect”, and Double Standards,	The	Huffington	Post,	
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stephen-zunes/libya-the-responsibility-_b_841168.
html	(25	April	2017).	
67 Ibid.
Petra Perišić: Implications of the Conflicts in libya and Syria...796
of	Russia	and	China	about	 interventionism	in	the	internal	affairs	of	foreign	
states,	thus	enhancing	the	chances	that	these	two	permanent	members	of	the	
SC	would	support	similar	resolutions	in	future.	After	the	Libyan	experience,	
however,	it	is	highly	likely	that	Russia	and	China	will	veto	resolutions	authori-
zing	the	use	of	military	force	under	the	RtoP	mantra.	The	case	of	Syria	was	a	
clear	example	of	such	restrained	approach	taken	by	these	two	states.
4. THE CASE OF SYRIA
4.1. Emergence of conflict and international response
Non-violent	demonstrations	in	Syria	began	in	February	2011.	They	were	
motivated	by	social	 issues,	primarily	poverty,	and	a	quest	 for	higher	degree	
of	democracy.	Another	wave	of	peaceful	demonstrations	occurred	 in	March	
2011,	following	the	rebellion	of	a	group	of	young	people	who	painted	anti-
government	graffiti.	The	government’s	reaction	to	the	graffiti	was	brutal,	thus	
resulting	 in	arrests	and	tortures.	Protests	quickly	spread	across	the	country,	
aiming	at	 the	 removal	of	president	Bashar	al-Assad	 from	power.	As	 the	go-
vernment	forces	responded	fiercely	to	the	protests,	an	uprising	soon	evolved	
into	a	civil	war.	It	was	largely	characterized	by	a	sectarian	division	between	the	
Alawite	minority,	to	which	Assad	and	his	forces	belonged,	and	the	majority	
Sunni	population.68	Each	 side	 to	 the	conflict	was	backed	by	 several	 foreign	
powers.	Assad	was	backed	by	Russia	and	Iran,	while	the	opposition	forces	were	
supported	by	Saudi	Arabia,	Qatar	and	Turkey	in	the	Middle	East,	as	well	as	by	
the	Western	states	–	the	US,	the	UK	and	France.
In	April	 2011,	 the	 demonstrations	 grew	 larger	 and	 the	 government	 em-
ployed	even	harsher	tactics.	The	Under-Secretary-General	for	Political	Affairs	
told	the	SC	members	that	“reliable	sources	are	consistently	reporting	the	use	
of	artillery	fire	against	unarmed	civilians;	door-to-door	arrest	campaigns;	the	
shooting	of	medical	personnel	who	attempt	 to	 aid	 the	wounded;	 raids	 aga-
inst	hospitals,	clinics	and	mosques;	and	the	purposeful	destruction	of	medi-
cal	supplies	and	arrest	of	medical	personnel”.69	In	2012,	the	Human	Rights	
68	 See:	Chulov,	M.;	Mahmood,	M.,	Syrian Sunnis fear Assad regime wants to ethnically 
cleanse Alawite heartland,	 The	 Guardian,	 22	 July	 2013,	 https://www.theguardian.
com/world/2013/jul/22/syria-sunnis-fear-alawite-ethnic-cleansing	(28	April	2017).
69	 UN	News	Centre,	Syrian army carrying out ‘major military operation’ against key city – UN 
official,	 http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=38201#.WQMrC9qLSUk	
(28	April	2017).
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Watch	reported	that	the	security	forces	conducted	several	large-scale	military	
operations	in	towns	and	cities,	resulting	in	mass	killings,	arrests	and	detenti-
ons,	as	well	as	the	use	of	torture.70
In	August	2012,	a	 report	 from	the	OHCHR	“found	a	pattern	of	human	
rights	 violations…which	may	 amount	 to	 crimes	 against	 humanity,”	 and	 re-
commended	the	SC	to	refer	Syria	to	the	International	Criminal	Court.71	The	
Human	Rights	Council	condemned	the	“grave	and	systematic	human	rights	
violations	by	the	Syrian	authorities”	and	established	the	Independent	Interna-
tional	Commission	of	Inquiry	to	investigate	all	alleged	violations	since	March	
2011.72
While	the	US	and	the	EU	imposed	economic	sanctions	and	an	arms	embar-
go	on	the	Assad	regime,	members	of	the	SC	condemned	the	violence	but	could	
not	agree	on	how	to	respond	to	it.	Western	states	and	the	Arab	League	advoca-
ted	Assad’s	removal	from	power.	The	first	Western	draft	resolution	reminded	
Assad	of	his	responsibility	to	protect	the	Syrian	population	and	condemned	
human	rights	violation	 in	Syria.73	The	 second	draft	 resolution	again	conde-
mned	the	violence	in	Syria	and	supported	the	decision	of	the	Arab	League	to	
facilitate	a	Syrian-led	political	transition.74	The	third	one	proposed	sanctions	
against	 Syria.75	 Russia	 and	China	 called	 for	 the	 respect	 of	 the	 principle	 of	
non-intervention	in	the	internal	affairs	of	Syria	and	vetoed	all	three	draft	re-
solutions.
Discussions	in	the	SC	revealed	high	tensions	among	states.	Following	dou-
ble-vetoes	wielded	by	China	and	Russia,	the	US	ambassador	stated	that	their	
government	was	“disgusted”	with	the	veto.76	Equally	harsh	was	the	response	of	
the	Russian	ambassador,	who	accused	“some	influential	members	of	the	inter-
national	community”	of	desiring	regime	change	in	Syria	and	of	disfavoring	a	
political	settlement.77	Two	resolutions	were	passed	at	that	time	–	one	proposed	
70 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2012: Syria,	 https://www.hrw.org/world-re-
port/2012/country-chapters/syria	(2	May	2017).
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.	 See	Human	 Rights	 Council	 resolutions:	 Resolution	 S-16/1	 and	 Resolution	
S-18/1.
73	 Draft	Resolution	October	2011,	UN	Doc	S/2011/612.
74	 Draft	Resolution	February	2012,	UN	Doc	S/2012/77.	The	resolution	similar	to	that	
vetoed	in	the	SC	was	later	adopted	in	the	General	Assembly	(GA	Res.	66/253).
75	 Draft	Resolution	July	2012,	UN	Doc	S/2012/538.
76	 UN	SCOR,	67th	Session,	6711th	mtg,	UN	Doc	S/PV.6711,	4	February	2012.
77 Ibid.
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by	the	US,	asking	for	a	team	of	UN	military	observers	to	support	Annan’s	six-
point	plan78,	and	another,	proposed	by	Russia,	establishing	a	UN	supervision	
mission	in	Syria.79
As	in	the	case	of	Libya,	the	Arab	League	responded	to	the	Syrian	crisis.	It	
suspended	Syrian	membership	in	the	League,	imposed	sanctions,	demanded	
a	cessation	of	hostilities	and	sent	its	monitors	to	observe	the	compliance	of	
Syrian	authorities	with	the	League’s	demands.80
Although	Assad	repeatedly	claimed	that	his	 forces	fought	against	terrori-
sts81,	denying	his	responsibility	for	the	atrocities	that	had	occurred,	the	Inde-
pendent	 International	Commission	of	 Inquiry82	 reported	 gross	 violations	of	
human	rights	committed	by	the	Syrian	regime.	The	Commission	“found	rea-
sonable	grounds	to	believe	that	Government	forces	and	the	Shabbiha	had	com-
mitted	crimes	against	humanity	of	murder	and	torture,	war	crimes	and	gross	
violations	of	international	human	rights	law	and	international	humanitarian	
law,	including	unlawful	killing,	torture,	arbitrary	arrest	and	detention,	sexual	
violence,	 indiscriminate	attacks,	pillaging	and	destruction	of	property”.83	 In	
addition,	allegations	of	 the	use	of	 chemical	weapons	emerged	 in	2012.84	 In	
2013,	chemical	attacks	occurred	in	Aleppo,	Al-Otaybeh	and	Ghouta	area	of	
Damascus,	 and	 in	 several	 other	 places.	 The	UN	 chemical	 weapons	 experts	
examined	 the	allegations	of	 the	use	of	 chemical	weapons	and	 reported	 that	
such	use	had	been	confirmed.85	It	was	not	quite	clear	which	side	to	the	conflict	
78	 SC	Res.	2042	(2012).
79	 SC	Res.	2043	(2012).
80	 MacFarquhar,	N.;	Bakri,	N.,	Isolating Syria, Arab League Imposes broad Sanctions,	New	
York	 Times,	 27	 November	 2011,	 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/28/world/
middleeast/arab-league-prepares-to-vote-on-syrian-sanctions.html	(15	May	2017).
81	 See:	Syria: Bashar al-Assad’s Speech – Tuesday 10 January,	 The	Guardian,	 https://
www.theguardian.com/world/middle-east-live/2012/jan/10/syria-bashar-al-assad-
speech-live-updates	(3	May	2017).
82	 The	Commission	was	established	on	22	August	2011	by	the	Human	Rights	Council	
through	resolution	S-17/1.	
83 Report of the Independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,	
Human	Rights	Council,	16	August	2012,	A/HRC/21/50.	All	the	reports	of	the	Com-
mission	 see	 at:	 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/IICISyria/Pages/Docu-
mentation.aspx.
84	 For	a	 timeline	of	 significant	events	 related	to	Syria’s	chemical	weapons	program	
from	2012	to	the	present,	see:	Arms	Control	Association,	https://www.armscontrol.
org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-Chemical-Weapons-Activity	(5	June	2017).
85 United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the 
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had	been	using	those	weapons,	as	the	government	and	the	rebel	forces	accused	
each	other	of	the	incident,	while	the	UN	refrained	from	assigning	blame	in	its	
report.	While	Russia	criticized	the	UN	report	and	raised	suspicion	that	rebels	
staged	the	attack,	 the	Western	powers	accused	Assad,	 raising	the	 issue	of	a	
possible	military	action	in	response	to	the	attack.86	The	idea	of	undertaking	
military	 intervention	materialized	when	 the	 latest	 chemical	weapons	 attack	
in	Syria	took	place	in	April	2017.	It	was	the	first	time	since	the	beginning	of	
the	Syrian	war	that	the	US	intervened	against	the	Syrian	government.	Assad	
called	the	incident	a	“fabrication”	used	to	justify	a	US	cruise	missile	strike	on	
Syria’s	Shayrat	airbase.87
4.2. Responsibility to Protect in the case of Syria
Strikingly	departing	from	the	Secretary-General’s	statement	from	the	be-
ginning	 of	 this	 article,	 which	 announced	 that	 RtoP	 is	 “here	 to	 stay”88,	 the	
case	of	Syria	seriously	raised	doubts	as	to	whether	the	principle	of	RtoP	can	
be	considered	more	efficient	than	the	controversial	doctrine	of	humanitarian	
intervention.
Although	the	OHCHR,	the	Human	Rights	Watch,	the	Independent	Inter-
national	Commission	of	Inquiry	and	others	all	reported	mass	atrocity	crimes	
occurring	in	Syria89,	the	international	community	failed	to	prevent	a	humani-
tarian	disaster.	Permanent	members	of	the	SC	could	not	reach	an	agreement	
on	adopting	the	resolution	which	would	authorize	the	use	of	force	aimed	at	sa-
ving	civilian	lives.	Russia	and	China	vetoed	each	resolution	proposing	not	only	
the	use	of	force,	but	also	the	imposition	of	sanctions	against	the	Syrian	regime.	
Syrian Arab Republic, Report on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area 
of Damascus on 21 August 2013,	Note	by	the	Secretary-General,	http://www.un.org/
zh/focus/northafrica/cwinvestigation.pdf	(2	June	2017).	
86	 Gutterman,	S.;	Holmes,	O.,	Russia says UN report on Syria Attack biased,	Reuters,	18	
September	 2013,	 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-russia-idUSBRE-
98H0RQ20130918	(2	June	2017).
87 Syria Chemical “Attack”: What we know,	BBC	News,	26	April	2017,	http://www.bbc.
com/news/world-middle-east-39500947	(2	June	2017).
88 Supra	note	4.
89	 In	April	2016,	the	UN	Special	Envoy	in	Syria	reported	that	around	400	000	people	
died	 in	 the	Syrian	civil	war.	A	 similar	 figure,	 a	death	 toll	of	470,000,	had	been	
reported	in	2015	by	the	Syrian	Research	Group.	See:	Hudson,	J.,	UN Envoy revises 
Syria Death Toll to 400,000,	http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/22/u-n-envoy-revises-
syria-death-toll-to-400000/	(2	June	2017).
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While	Russia	traditionally	raised	suspicion	of	the	true	motives	of	the	Western	
involvement	in	the	Syrian	conflict,	its	own	true	motives	for	non-intervention	
were	 brought	 into	 question.	Russian	 close	 ties	with	 the	Syrian	 government	
and	its	strategic	interests,	such	as	the	Russian	naval	base	in	the	Syrian	city	of	
Tartous,	were	considered	as	least	as	important	as	its	general	support	for	the	
non-intervention	principle.90 
Divisions	over	Syria	 in	the	SC	made	individual	states	and	regional	orga-
nizations	 take	certain	actions.	The	Arab	League,	 the	EU,	Turkey	and	other	
states	diplomatically	isolated	the	Syrian	regime	and	by	March	2012	at	least	49	
countries	had	imposed	bilateral	targeted	sanctions,	while	at	least	14	had	closed	
their	embassies	in	Damascus.91
Although	 the	 international	 community,	 acting	 through	 the	SC,	 failed	 to	
take	military	action	in	Syria,	the	Syrian	civil	war	has	been	characterized	by	a	
high	degree	of	foreign	military	involvement	of	individual	states	or	groups	of	
states.	For	years	now,	the	US-led	coalition,	as	well	as	several	states	from	the	
Middle	East,	has	been	taking	part	in	a	fight	against	ISIL.92	On	the	other	hand,	
in	2015	Russia	 responded	 to	Assad’s	 request	 for	military	assistance	and	 la-
unched	air	strikes,	firstly	targeting	ISIL,	and	subsequently	other	Syrian	rebels	
as	well.93	Finally,	the	latest	intervention	took	place	in	April	2017,	when	the	US	
for	the	first	time	since	the	beginning	of	the	Syrian	civil	war	launched	an	attack	
against	the	Syrian	government,	as	retaliation	for	the	chemical	weapons	attack	
that	killed	dozens	of	civilians.94	The	US	and	Russian	military	forces	are	still	
present	in	Syria	at	the	moment,	apparently	both	fighting	ISIL.	However,	in	
spite	of	having	the	same	enemy,	cooperation	between	the	two	states	is	scarce.	
90	 Williams,	P.	R.;	Ulbrick,	J.	T.;	Worboys,	J.,	Preventing Mass Atrocity Crimes: The Res-
ponsibility to Protect and the Syria Crisis,	Case	Western	Journal	of	International	Law,	
vol.	45,	2012,	p.	489.
91	 Adams,	S.,	Failure to Protect: Syria and the UN SC,	Global	Centre	for	the	Responsi-
bility	to	Protect,	Occasional	Paper	Series,	no.	5,	March	2015,	p.	11.
92	 Fantz,	A.,	Who’s doing what in the coalition battle against ISIS,	CNN,	9	October	2014,	
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/10/09/world/meast/isis-coalition-nations/	(30	May	2017).	
93 Russia Joins War in Syria: Five key points,	BBC	News,	1	October	2015,	http://www.
bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34416519	(30	May	2017).
94	 An	attack,	authorized	by	President	Trump,	departs	from	the	previous	US	practice.	
When	a	 chemical	 attack	occurred	 in	2013,	 crossing	 the	President	Obama’s	 “red	
line”,	Obama	was	 not	willing	 to	 strike	Assad’s	 regime,	 at	 least	 not	without	 the	
congressional	approval.	See:	Herb,	J.,	How Trump’s Syria airstrike is different from – 
and similar to – Obama’s,	CNN,	07	April	2017,	http://edition.cnn.com/2017/04/07/
politics/obama-syria-airstrikes-trump/index.html	(7	June	2017).
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Some	argue	that	this	is	because	they	cannot	agree	with	respect	to	what	should	
happen	in	Syria	once	ISIL	is	destroyed.95
Individual	 states	 taking	military	 actions	 is	 exactly	what	 the	2001	 ICISS	
Report	warned	about.	It	pointed	out	that	“the	SC	should	take	into	account	in	
all	its	deliberations	that,	if	it	fails	to	discharge	its	responsibility	to	protect	in	
conscience-shocking	situations	crying	out	for	action,	concerned	states	may	not	
rule	out	other	means	to	meet	the	gravity	and	urgency	of	that	situation	–	and	
that	the	stature	and	credibility	of	the	United	Nations	may	suffer	thereby”.96
Several	conclusions	could	arguably	be	drawn	from	the	Syrian	experience.	
First,	future	resolutions	implementing	RtoP	should	be	as	precise	as	possi-
ble,	 in	order	to	minimize	the	chances	that	different	states	will	 interpret	the	
same	resolution	in	different	ways.	This	precision	should	refer	not	only	to	the	
sole	text	of	the	resolution,	but	also	to	the	discussions	among	the	SC	members	
preceding	the	adoption	of	the	resolution.	What	happened	with	the	Resolution	
1973	–	when	abstaining	states	expressed	discontent	with	the	vagueness	of	the	
resolution	aims	right	after	the	adoption	of	the	resolution	–	should	be	avoided	
in	future.
Second,	Russia	and	China	by	unconditionally	adhering	to	the	non-interven-
tion	principle,	regardless	of	the	need	to	save	the	civilian	population	in	particu-
lar	cases,	risk	undertaking	unilateral	military	interventions	by	the	US	and	its	
allies.	The	US	has	demonstrated	on	numerous	occasions	that	it	is	not	willing	
to	abstain	from	military	action	–	justified	or	not	–	(only)	because	that	action	
is	not	authorized	by	the	SC.	A	better	scenario	could	have	been	constructed	if	
Russia	and	China	pursued	an	agreement	within	the	UN	system,	rather	than	
vetoing	even	moderately	formulated	resolutions	as	in	the	case	of	Syria,	thus	
ultimately	contributing	to	the	unilateral	activity	of	the	Western	states.
Third,	if	a	military	intervention	is	approved	by	the	SC	in	a	particular	case,	
it	should	be	conducted	as	unbiasedly	as	possible,	with	the	sole	aim	of	saving	
the	civilian	population	at	risk.	In	the	case	of	Libya,	the	Western	allies	took	
sides,	thus	desiring	regime	change.	The	price	to	be	paid	was	the	Russian	and	
Chinese	veto	in	the	Syrian	crisis.	If	a	foreign	intervention	is	only	about	saving	
civilian	lives	and	has	no	hidden	agenda,	the	likelihood	that	the	SC	members	
will	support	it	is	much	higher.
95	 Friedman,	U.,	What is Putin up to in Syria?,	The	Atlantic,	19	June	2017,	https://
www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/06/russia-isis-baghdadi-
syria/530649/	(20	June	2017).
96	 The	Report,	XIII.
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5. LIBYA AND SYRIA – A COMPARISON
Reasons	behind	a	disparate	reaction	of	the	international	community	in	the	
conflicts	in	Libya	and	Syria	may	be	divided	into	two	categories.	The	first	one	
refers	to	the	domestic	situation	 in	each	of	these	countries,	 for	 instance,	the	
way	in	which	their	rulers	responded	to	the	protests,	the	organization	of	the	
opposition	forces,	the	position	and	strength	of	each	state	within	the	region,	
and	others.	The	second	one	refers	to	particular	interests	of	powerful	states	in	
these	two	countries.
Although	the	conflicts	in	both	countries	are	characterized	by	a	clash	betwe-
en	the	government	and	the	opposition	forces,	resulting	in	a	heavy	humanita-
rian	situation,	these	two	crises	differ	 in	many	ways.	While	Gaddafi	brutally	
responded	to	the	protests	in	Libya,	calling	the	protesters	“cockroaches”	and	
threatening	to	kill	them,	Assad’s	rhetoric	was	more	moderate.	In	his	speech	
before	the	Syrian	parliament	in	Damascus,	he	said	that	“security	forces	were	
given	orders	not	to	harm	citizens	during	the	protests”.97	His	next	speech,	in	
which	he	promised	reform	and	a	more	humble	government98,	was	even	more	
conciliatory	than	the	one	before	the	Parliament.	Such	a	position	was	signifi-
cantly	different	from	the	one	Gaddafi	had	taken.
The	second	difference	is	the	one	between	the	Libyan	and	Syrian	oppositi-
on.	While	the	opposition	in	Libya	was	more	or	less	consolidated,	the	oppositi-
on	in	Syria	was	extremely	fractured,	ranging	from	the	Free	Syrian	Army,	to	the	
Islamic	State,	al-Nusra	and	others.99	Undertaking	a	military	intervention	aga-
inst	Assad	at	the	same	time	meant	strengthening	the	position	of	an	opposition	
group	such	as	ISIL,	which	is	a	consequence	that	every	state	wishes	to	avoid.100
97 Syrian Leader Blames Protests on “Conspirators”; No Reforms Announced,	 Radio	 Free	
Europe/Radio	Liberty,	available	on:	https://www.rferl.org/a/assad_speech/3541439.
html	(6	June	2017).
98	 Marsh,	K.,	Syria protests continue as Bashar al-Assad promises reform,	The	Guardian,	16	
April	2011,	available	on:	https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/16/bashar-
al-assad-syria	(6	June	2017).
99	 Sary,	G.,	Syria Conflict: Who are the groups fighting Assad?,	BBC	News,	11	November	
2015,	http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34710635	(6	June	2017).
100	 After	the	US	airstrike	in	Syria	in	April	2017,	Russian	Prime	Minister	Medvedev	
said	the	US	strike	was	“good	news	for	terrorists”.	See:	Khomami,	N.;	Grierson,	J.,	
US military strikes on Syria: what we know so far,	The	Guardian,	07	April	2017,	https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/07/us-airstrikes-on-syria-donald-trump-
what-we-know-so-far	(7	June	2017).
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The	third	difference	may	be	observed	in	the	regional	actors,	primarily	the	
Arab	League,	which	are	 said	 to	have	played	more	active	 role	 in	 the	case	of	
Libya.	It	took	less	than	a	month	from	the	beginning	of	the	unrest	in	Libya	for	
the	League	to	suspend	the	membership	of	that	state.	Conversely,	in	the	case	
of	Syria,	 the	League	 suspended	 its	membership	after	about	nine	months	of	
severe	fighting.	Such	inconsistency	between	the	League’s	reactions	is	said	to	
be	caused	by	the	close	political,	economic	and	personal	ties	between	many	of	
its	members	and	the	Assad	government.101
Although	all	the	above	reasons	might	have	contributed	in	some	extent	to	
the	decision	to	intervene	in	Libya	and	not	to	intervene	in	Syria,	it	is	the	disa-
greement	between	the	permanent	members	of	the	SC	that	played	the	decisive	
role.	Disunity	among	the	permanent	 five	existed	ever	since	the	adoption	of	
the	Resolution	1973	and	 grew	 stronger	 as	NATO	exceeded	 the	 strict	man-
date	of	the	Resolution.	This	certainly	influenced	the	decision	of	Russia	and	
China	to	adopt	an	utterly	restrained	approach	when	discussing	in	the	SC	not	
only	on	the	use	of	force	in	Syria,	but	also	on	the	imposition	of	sanctions.	The	
most	illustrative	explanation	of	the	situation	was	perhaps	given	by	the	Russian	
representative	 in	the	Council,	who	drew	a	comparison	between	the	cases	of	
Libya	and	Syria,	stating	that	“the	situation	in	Syria	cannot	be	considered	in	
the	SC	separately	from	the	Libyan	experience”.102	He	further	suggested	that	
“the	international	community	is	alarmed	by	statements	that	compliance	with	
SC	resolutions	on	Libya	in	the	NATO	interpretation	is	a	model	for	the	future	
actions	of	NATO	in	implementing	the	responsibility	to	protect…”103	He	stre-
ssed	that	“the	demand	for	a	quick	ceasefire	turned	into	a	full-fledged	civil	war”,	
that	“the	situation	in	connection	with	the	no-fly	zones	has	morphed	into	the	
bombing	of	 oil	 refineries,	 television	 stations	 and	other	 civilian	 sites”,	while	
“the	arms	embargo	has	morphed	into	a	naval	blockade	in	western	Libya”.104 
The	Russian	Representative	concluded	that	“these	types	of	models	should	be	
excluded	from	global	practice	once	and	for	all”.105	However,	it	was	not	only	
an	excessive	military	intervention	in	Libya	that	made	a	difference	in	the	case	
of	Syria.	It	was	also	the	post-Gaddafi	turmoil,	characterized	by	violence	and	
101	 Zifcak,	op. cit.	(fn.	52),	p.	85.
102	 UN	SCOR,	66th	session,	6627th	meeting,	UN	Doc	S/PV.6627	(4	October	2011),	
3-4.
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
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lawlessness,	that	further	complicated	international	responses	to	the	ongoing	
crisis	in	Syria	by	raising	doubts	about	the	long-term	results	of	the	RtoP-type	
military	action.106
Disagreement	among	the	permanent	members	over	taking	action	in	Syria,	
however,	was	not	exclusively	a	matter	of	principle.	As	usually	is	the	case	with	
raising	foreign	military	intervention,	interests	of	great	powers	came	into	play	
in	both	cases.	 In	 the	case	of	Libya,	 interests	of	 great	powers	were	different	
than	in	the	case	of	Syria.	Apparently,	there	had	been	an	odd	situation	betwe-
en	the	US	and	Gaddafi	over	Libyan	oil	reserves.	Allegedly,	prior	to	the	2011	
intervention	Gaddafi	demanded	tough	contract	terms	with	the	US	companies	
and	was	unsatisfied	with	the	profits	that	the	US	oil	companies	made	in	Libya.	
The	US	referred	to	this	as	“pursuing	increasingly	nationalistic	policies	in	the	
energy	sector	that	could	jeopardize	efficient	exploitation	of	Libya’s	extensive	
oil	and	gas	 reserves”.107	On	the	other	hand,	although	 it	 seemed	that	Russia	
had	very	little	strategic	interests	in	Libya,	its	engagement	in	Syria	was	critical	
for	maintaining	some	of	Russia’s	crucial	interests.	It	is	a	well-known	fact	that	
Assad	has	been	for	decades	one	of	the	few	Russia’s	allies	in	the	Middle	East.	
As	has	already	been	pointed	out,	Russia	wanted	to	protect	a	key	naval	facility	
in	the	Syrian	port	of	Tartous,	which	serves	as	Russia’s	sole	Mediterranean	base	
for	its	Black	Sea	fleet.108	Secondly,	Russia	supplied	Syrian	armed	forces	with	
weapons,	thus	representing	the	biggest	arms	importer	to	Syria.109	In	addition	
to	these	two	most	 frequent	arguments	that	support	Russian	 involvement	 in	
the	Syrian	war,	there	might	be	another	one	–	the	fear	of	Islamic	extremists	and	
terrorists	with	whom	Russians	themselves	have	had	experience	in	the	region	of	
northern	Caucasus.110	As	for	the	US	motive	for	intervening	in	Syria,	the	most	
106	 Thakur,	R.,	Syria and the Responsibility to Protect,	http://www.e-ir.info/2014/02/04/
syria-and-the-responsibility-to-protect/	(9	June	2017).
107	 Mufson,	S.,	Conflict in Libya: US oil companies sit on sidelines as Gaddafi maintains hold,	
The	 Washington	 Post,	 10	 June	 2011,	 https://www.washingtonpost.com/busine-
ss/economy/conflict-in-libya-us-oil-companies-sit-on-sidelines-as-gaddafi-mainta-
ins-hold/2011/06/03/AGJq2QPH_story.html?utm_term=.c86847e0070e,	 (9	 June	
2017).
108 Syria Crisis:	Where Key Countries Stand,	BBC	News,	30	October	2015,	http://www.
bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23849587	(9	June	2017).
109	 Grove,	Th.;	Solomon,	E.,	Russia boosts arms sales to Syria despite world pressure,	Reu-
ters,	 21	 February	 2012,	 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-russia-arms-idU-
STRE81K13420120221	(9	June	2017).
110	 Pukhov,	R.,	Why Russia is backing Syria,	The	New	York	Times,	6	July	2012,	http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/07/07/opinion/why-russia-supports-syria.html	(9	June	2017).
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prominent	reason	seems	to	be	the	territorial	proximity	of	Syria	to	Israel,	the	
US	ally.	The	US	military	 intervention	against	Assad,	with	whom	Israel	was	
traditionally	at	odds,	meant	increasing	Israel’s	stability	and	security.	After	the	
intervention	in	April	2017,	Israel	hailed	the	engagement	of	its	strong	ally.111
In	light	of	all	the	above	circumstances,	it	may	be	concluded	that,	although	
appearing	to	be	quite	similar,	the	cases	of	Libya	and	Syria	differ	in	many	res-
pects.	Some	might	argue	that	the	only	relevant	circumstance	is	the	humanita-
rian	disaster,	the	consequences	of	which	are	the	same	in	both	cases.	However,	
it	also	holds	true	that	the	very	essence	of	world	politics	lies	in	the	interests	of	
great	powers,	the	latter	being	a	relevant	factor	in	a	decision-making	process.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The	case	of	Syria	has	shown	that	humanitarian	disasters,	such	as	those	in	
Bosnia	or	Rwanda,	are	likely	to	happen	again,	despite	of	the	proclaimed	in-
tention	of	the	international	community	to	stop	them.	This	indisputable	fact	
again	raises	the	question	of	(in)efficiency	of	the	current	legal	regulation	on	the	
use	of	force.	A	system	in	which	the	permissibility	to	use	force,	except	for	in	
self-defense,	is	based	on	the	agreement	of	the	permanent	five,	has	proved	to	
be	inefficient	on	numerous	occasions.	If	we	disregard	the	post-Cold	war	tem-
porary	unity	among	the	SC	permanent	members,	we	can	claim	that	the	US,	
the	UK	and	France	on	the	one	side	and	Russia	and	China	on	the	other,	do	not	
seem	to	be	able	to	reach	an	agreement	on	decisions	involving	the	use	of	force.	
This	poses	a	paramount	problem,	as	the	efficiency	of	RtoP	–	although	in	the-
ory	presupposing	the	primary	obligation	of	proper	governments	in	assuring	the	
rights	of	their	populations	–	in	practice	rests	upon	the	international	commu-
nity,	that	is,	the	SC.	Some	estimates	show	that	in	the	20th	century	some	262	
million	people	were	killed	by	their	own	governments,	which	is	six	times	higher	
than	the	number	of	those	killed	in	interstate	wars.112
Applying	RtoP	 in	 the	Libyan	 crisis	was	 at	 the	moment	 the	 intervention	
took	place	perceived	by	many	as	a	triumph	of	RtoP.	The	case	of	Syria,	howe-
ver,	has	shown	that	the	principle	was	applied	in	Libya	solely	because	the	need	
to	 protect	 lives	 coincided	with	 the	 interest	 of	 intervening	 states.	 It	 would,	
111	 Mitnick,	J.,	Many in Israel Cheer US attack on Syria as a welcome sign of a more assertive 
key ally,	Los	Angeles	Time,	07	April	2017,	http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-isra-
el-syria-trump-20170408-story.html	(9	June	2017).
112	 Bellamy,	A.	J.,	The Responsibility to Protect,	in:	Williams,	P.	D.	(ed.),	Security Studies: 
An Introduction,	Routledge,	Abingdon,	2012,	p.	487.	
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however,	be	exaggerated	to	say	that	RtoP	triumphed	after	Libya	and	died	af-
ter	Syria.	No	such	dramatic	conclusion	can	be	reached.	We	can	claim,	on	the	
other	hand,	that	the	concept	of	RtoP	faces	the	same	obstacles	as	the	doctrine	
of	humanitarian	intervention.	In	that	sense	the	idea	of	separating	these	two	
concepts	can	be	considered	mainly	unsuccessful.	In	spite	of	the	fact	that	the	
RtoP	doctrine	differs	 from	humanitarian	 intervention	 in	 some	 respects,	 the	
key	issues	pertinent	to	both	concepts	remain	the	same	–	and	unresolved.
Following	the	Libyan	intervention,	there	have	been	attempts	to	renew	dis-
cussions	on	RtoP.	One	such	initiative	came	from	Brazil,	which	introduced	the	
“Responsibility	While	Protecting	(RwP)”	concept,	aiming	at	providing	guide-
lines	on	how	to	implement	RtoP	more	efficiently.113
The	appropriateness	of	undertaking	future	military	interventions	will	have	
to	be	evaluated	within	the	SC	on	a	case-by-case	basis.	The	decision	to	interve-
ne	or	not	intervene	will	depend	on	the	humanitarian	situation	in	a	particular	
state	and,	inevitably,	on	the	interests	of	intervening	states.	In	an	ideal	scena-
rio,	RtoP	would	be	applied	each	time	when	human	lives	are	sufficiently	en-
dangered,	which	would	be	measured	in	accordance	with	objective	parameters,	
thus	disregarding	strategic	or	other	interests	of	any	state.	However,	it	seems	
unrealistic	to	expect	states	to	take	such	a	principled	approach.
The	problem	of	application	of	RtoP	is	just	a	part	of	the	overall	controversy	
over	the	use	of	force	in	international	relations.	Inefficiency	of	the	SC	makes	
the	system	of	the	use	of	force	established	by	the	UN	Charter	untenable	and	
no	rhetorical	inventions	can	change	or	overcome	that.	The	Libyan	and	Syrian	
cases	have	 shown	 that	RtoP	will	 be	 applied	 selectively	up	until	 a	 thorough	
reform	of	the	entire	system	of	the	use	of	force	is	undertaken.	
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UTJECAJ SUKOBA U LIBIJI I SIRIJI NA DOKTRINU 
“ODGOVORNOSTI PRUŽANJA ZAŠTITE”
Kada je 2011. godine libijski diktator Muammar Gaddafi odgovorio na pobunu 
protiv svoje vlasti teškim kršenjima ljudskih prava, Vijeće sigurnosti je, pozivajući se 
na načelo “odgovornosti pružanja zaštite” (RtoP) usvojilo Rezoluciju 1973, kojom je 
ovlastilo države na upotrebu oružane sile kako bi se zaustavilo stradavanje civila u 
Libiji. Taj čin Vijeća sigurnosti dao je naslutiti da je načelo RtoP zaživjelo i da će 
ono poslužiti kao učinkovito sredstvo u borbi za očuvanje ljudskih prava i u budućim 
slučajevima. No sukob u Siriji koji je uslijedio nedugo nakon toga pokazao je da su takva 
predviđanja bila preuranjena. Stalne članice Vijeća sigurnosti u slučaju Sirije nisu 
zauzele jedinstveni stav pa rezolucija kojom bi se ovlastilo države na upotrebu sile s ciljem 
sprječavanja humanitarne katastrofe nije usvojena.
U članku se analiziraju sukobi u Libiji i Siriji te reakcija međunarodne zajednice 
na svaki od njih. Osobito se istražuju razlozi različitog postupanja Vijeća sigurnosti 
u dvama slučajevima koji, iako se razlikuju u nizu značajki, imaju bitnu zajedničku 
karakteristiku – kršenje ljudskih prava stanovništva od strane središnje vlasti.
Zaključak je članka da kod odlučivanja u Vijeću sigurnosti o poduzimanju oružanih 
intervencija, pa bile one uzrokovane i humanitarnim razlozima, države ne nastupaju 
principijelno, već u praksi uvijek gledaju i svoje strateške i druge interese. Tek kada ti 
interesi koincidiraju s humanitarnom katastrofom, RtoP načelo – točnije, njegov aspekt 
“reakcije” – biva primijenjeno. 
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